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Abstract 
In Jones (2002), Lucas (2009), and Lucas and Moll (2014), among others, growth is a 
function of new ideas, and reflects Kuznets (1960) useful knowledge (or testable knowledge) 
as a main driver of growth. In both Kuznets and Jones, the discovery of new ideas is tied to 
population growth. In the long run, the stock of ideas is proportional to the number of 
researchers, which is proportional to population. This is the scale factor, where essentially, 
long-run growth is tied to population growth in the advanced countries. The growth of 
knowledge due to new ideas depends on the number of people producing them and their 
productivity, essentially determines Total Factor Productivity growth (TFP). During the 
transition to the long-run, knowledge in excess of the long-run population growth, i.e., excess 
knowledge, explains most of the productivity growth. We use EUKLEMS 2017 data to show 
that the model explains 80 percent of the international productivity growth differentials 
because excess knowledge varies from one country to another. Effective world research 
efforts diffuse at a different pace from one country to another. We also modify the model and 
test hypotheses about sector-led growth such as finance and ICT. Finally, we shed light on the 
current missing productivity conundrum.   
JEL Classification Numbers E10, O40 
Keywords: endogenous growth, Growth accounting, transitional dynamic, labor productivity 
growth, estimation, and measurements.    
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1. Introduction 
The causal relationship between population growth and per capita output growth in 
advanced countries is captured in Jones (2002) model of economic growth. The model 
is consistent with Kuznets’ thesis (e.g., 1960) that population growth causes per capita 
output growth. In his view, among other channels, useful knowledge (or testable 
knowledge) could be a primary driver of per capita output growth.
i
 See Mokyr (2002) 
for discussion about useful knowledge. Prescott (1998) calls it usable knowledge.  
 
The idea that population growth causes per capita output growth has been 
controversial although it has been shown to hold under three conditions. First, the 
aggregate production function is an increasing return to scale; second, the increase in 
population growth is associated with a greater increase in the growth of capital stock; 
and third, the form of the production function changes when population increases.
ii
 
Today, the assumption of increasing returns is basic in all endogenous growth models. 
 
In Jones (2002) just like in Lucas (2009) and Lucas and Moll (2014), long-run growth 
arises from the worldwide discovery of ideas, however in the former, researchers 
produce a flow of new ideas. In the long run, the stock of ideas is proportional to the 
number of researchers, which is proportional to population. This is the scale factor, 
where essentially, long-run growth is tied to population growth in the advanced 
countries. Constant growth could, temporarily, continue at a faster rate if research 
intensity, which creates the new ideas, rises steadily over time. The model 
distinguishes between two constant growth paths. At a balanced growth path, all 
variables in the economy grow at constant exponential rates forever. This growth rate 
is associated with the long-run steady state, and it is determined, essentially, by 
population growth and some deep parameters. Another constant path is associated 
with the transitional dynamics. This path is a function of factor of production, human 
capital, and excess ideas.  
 
Excess ideas, or excess knowledge as we call it in this paper, is the deviations of the 
growth rate of TFP from steady-state growth. TFP growth is determined by the 
effective world research effort. As knowledge increases, it generates a transition path 
growth effect and a level effect on income. Per capita growth could settle down at a 
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constant rate that is higher than its long-run rate. And, as the fraction of time that 
individuals spend accumulating skills and knowledge and the share of the labor force 
devoted to research level off, the economy’s growth rate gradually decline to its long-
run rate.  
 
The similarities between Jones and Kuznets are intriguing. Essentially, a doubling of 
the population in the advanced countries – ceteris paribus – doubles the effective 
world research efforts, which causes the long-run level of income to increase by a 
certain positive fraction.   
 
Jones (2002) provides time series evidence that growth accounting reveals that the 
factors determining transitional dynamic explain 80 percent of recent U.S. growth. 
Razzak et al. (2016) provides, a relatively, large cross-sectional evidence to Jones 
(2002) time series analysis. Neither one explains cross-country international 
productivity growth differentials. 
Prescott (1998) shows that differences in factors growth rates cannot explain 
international differences in income per person growth rates. The same is true for 
savings and intangible capital differences, human capital or any other capital. This is 
the main objective of this paper. 
First, this paper fits Jones (2002) model to10-EU advanced countries plus the U.S. 
using EUKLEMS (2017) data. We use the model to explain international productivity 
growth differentials. We show that differences in excess knowledge across countries 
explain 80 percent of the differences in productivity growth. The second objective is 
to modify the model to include a sector-effect then test the hypotheses about 
information technology-led growth; manufacturing -led growth; and finance-led 
growth. The model could be used to test any sector, but we focus on these three 
sectors. More literature that is recent emphasized ICT as a driver for economic growth 
(e.g., Jorgenson, 2001 and Jorgenson et. al, 2000). The idea is that ICT capital and 
investments cause economic growth in the same way different types of capital, e.g., 
human capital (Mankiw et al. 1992) and intangible capital (McGrattan and Prescott, 
2010), also affect economic growth within the neoclassical growth framework. 
Information technology improves the firm’s factor-input supply, final demand, 
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marketing, management efficiency, and many aspects of the production process. A 
survey of this literature (Kretschmer, 2012) found that econometric estimates of the 
ICT elasticity vary considerably across studies. It concludes that a 10 percent increase 
in ICT results in a 0.5 – 0.6 percent increase in productivity growth. Stanley et al. 
(2015) undertakes a meta-regression analysis to 58 studies, document a specification 
bias and selection bias in favor of growth effect. For earlier studies see Oliner and 
Sichel (2000) who reported strong positive effects of various types of ICT capital on 
output and labor productivity growth during the 1990s in the United States.    
Economists argued that manufacturing is the driver of growth, e.g., Verdoon’s law, 
Verdoon (1980). It is a standard economic development argument that growth 
requires increasing the share of manufacturing and reducing the share of agriculture in 
developing countries. The idea is that manufacturing processes involve a relatively 
larger value added. The histories of industrial nations also indicate that they began to 
grow when manufacturing share began to increase. The recent Chinese economic 
growth is explained by the rise of manufacturing. 
There is also an old and long literature on the relationship between finance and 
growth. Early writings include Schumpeter (1911), who argued that efficient financial 
markets, via the credit channel, help innovative entrepreneurs to embark on 
innovative business activities, and that’s how the economy grows.iii In the 1990s 
endogenous growth models, such as Romer (1986), treated finance as an external 
effect on aggregate investment efficiency, which offsets the diminishing marginal 
product of capital, and sustain growth.
iv
 This paper differs significantly from the 
literature on finance and growth in testing this hypothesis because the transitional 
growth path is a function of the sector’s TFP growth rather than credit, money, and 
other financial indicators.   
Finally, we address the missing productivity puzzle, which has been an issue of recent 
research (e.g. Feldstein, 2017). Since the model predicts that the long-run growth in 
any country in the sample is tied to all of the advanced countries population growth, 
the missing productivity growth could be explained by declining working age 
population in developed countries, declining fertility rate, declining youth population, 
and aging, which contribute to declining effective world research efforts.   
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Next, we describe the model; Section 3 includes the measurements and estimations of 
key parameters, computations of the key parameters and variables of model that 
affects growth, and the results. Section 4 concludes. There are two appendices, one 
for the modification of the model to account for the sectoral effect, and the other is a 
data appendix.  
2. The Original model 
We briefly describe Jones (2002) model, which encapsulates Kuznets’ thesis about 
useable knowledge.  
  
In each economy in the world, output of goods is produced by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. The production function has three elements: the stock of physical 
capital, the total quantity of human capital, and the stock of ideas (knowledge). The 
production function is a constant return to scale in the physical capital and human 
capital, and an increasing return to scale in the three factors.  
  1
tYttt
HKAY  ,        (1) 
where tY is real output, tK  is physical capital, tYH is the total quantity of human capital, 
and tA  is the accumulating stock of knowledge created in the world. It is assumed that
10  , and 0 , which implies a constant return to scale in K , and YH , and an 
increasing return to scale in K , YH and A as 111   . The subscriptY
refers to the production of goods. 
 
The physical stock of capital evolves as in the Perpetual Inventory equation, where 
people forgo some consumption, and the resulting saving out of output is invested. 
Capital depreciates at some constant exogenous depreciation rate. 
 
Human capital is the product of human capital per person and the total amount of 
labor employed in the production of goods and services. It is produced when people 
forgo time working in the labor force. This is consistent with the (Mincer, 1974). The 
aggregate human capital employed to produce output is: 
 
,YttYt LhH           (2) 
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where th is the stock of human capital per person multiplied by the total amount of 
labor, which is produced by forgoing time in the labor force.  The individual spends 
time in education, training …etc. This time is hl , so th is: 
 
,0,   htlt eh         (3) 
 
Equation (3) is like the equation shown in Bils and Klenow (2000), where  is the 
rate of return on education.  
 
Knowledge is non-rival and non-excludable. Once it is created it could be used by 
others (Romer, 1990). Knowledge created anywhere in the world is available for use 
by any country.
v
 Thus, the stock of knowledge is the cumulative stock of knowledge 
anywhere in the world. Researchers produce Knowledge. There is a production 
function, where by the growth rate of knowledge is a function of the effective world 
research efforts, which is weighted sum of the number of researchers in each country. 
The weights adjust for human capital. Thus, the number of ideas produced at any 
point in time depends on the number of researchers and the existing stock of 
knowledge.  Jones (2002) assumes that effective world research is produced in the 5 
advanced countries in the world (the U.S., the U.K., Germany, France and Japan). 
This formulation is fully consistent with Kuznets (1960, p. 330). He says, “We should 
recognize that the creative and educated groups in developed countries – and they are 
the central reference point here – serve partly, and should serve more fully the 
economic needs of the whole world, not merely of their own countries.”  
 
,00 

AAHA tAtt
        (4)
 
 
Where a dot on the variable denotes the growth rate, and AtH is the effective world 
research effort, and is given by: 
 



M
i
itAitAt LhH
1
, ,

        (5)
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Where ith is human capital and itAL , is the number of researchers. The subscript A in AH
refers to the human capital used in the production of knowledge as opposed toY in YH
, which is the human capital used in the production of goods (equation 1).  
 
Finally, the model has a resource constraint on labor such that an economy populated 
by a number of identical, infinitely lived agents, whereby the number grows over time 
at a common and constant exogenous growth rate n . Each individual is endowed with 
one unit of time, which is divided among producing goods and services, ideas, and 
human capital. 
 
Along the balanced growth path, capital-output ratio, labor used in production – total 
labor, and human capital are constant. The economy exhibits a stable balanced growth 
path, whereby all the variables grow at constant exponential rates forever. The 
allocations of factors along that path are also constant. The growth rate of output per 
worker is proportional to the growth rate of effective world research. Since human 
capital is constant along the balanced growth path, the growth of the effective number 
of world researchers is driven by population growth. The long-run per capita growth 
is ultimately tied to world population growth as in Kuznets (1960).   
 
A key result of the model is that the long-run per capita growth is ultimately tied to 
population growth of the advanced countries. If the level of this population doubles, 
ceteris-paribus, the effective world research effort also doubles, which cause the 
long-run income level in each country increases by a factor 2 . The deep parameter
is




 11
.  
  
The model results in the following growth-accounting equation: 
 
     
 ,1
)(
1
StateSteady
DynamicalTransition
knowledgeexcess
tYttttt nnAlhYKy 
















  
  
    (6) 
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where

ty is real output per hour-worked growth rate (a dot on top of the variable refers 
to growth rates). The other variables are defined earlier. Contrary to all cross-country 
growth regressions, in this model the covariance between per capita growth and 
population growth is > 0, and not negative.  Mankiw et al. (1992) interpret a negative 
covariance of per capita growth and population growth as reflecting the transition 
dynamics of the neoclassical growth model, i.e., a higher population growth reduces 
the steady-state capital-output ratio because more investments are required to 
maintain the existing capital-output ratio as population is growing. The first term of 
the equation captures this effect. The last term in the equation comes from the fact 
that the stock of ideas grows at a constant rate (and the stock is inferred from the 
flow). 
 
The interpretation is that the RHS terms (except the last) are zero in the steady state. 
These terms represent the transitional dynamic.  If an economy is close to its balanced 
growth path, the last term should account for most of growth.  Therefore, the 
productivity growth transitional dynamic is a function of capital intensity, human 
capital growth, growth rate of labor allocated for the production of output, and excess 
knowledge )
1
( nAt 





.  Excess knowledge represents the growth rate of TFP, 
which is a function of effective world research efforts, in excess of population growth 
of the advanced countries. 
 
Appendix I includes the solution of the modified model, which includes the sectoral 
effect. The assumption is that  ts AA t 0 , where the subscript s denotes the sector. The 
model boils down to the following growth-accounting equation: 
 
 ,)1(
)(
1
,
StateSteady
DynamicalTransition
knowledgeexcess
tsYttttt nnAlhYKy 
















  
  
   (7) 
 
Where all the variables are defined earlier and the subscript s  refers to sector. 
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3. Testing the prediction of the model 
3.1 Measuring the parameters and the variables  
We use EUKLEMS (2017) data to (1) test the model by examining how much of the 
productivity growth is explained by excess knowledge; (2) how much of the 
international productivity growth differentials is explained by excess knowledge 
differentials? and (3) test sector-led growth hypotheses. EUKLEMS (2017) include 
data for all the EU countries plus the United States. We only use 10 EU countries, 
which have all data needed to test the model. Most of the other countries do not have 
the required data to test the model. The countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherland, Spain, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S. The 
data are described in the data appendix II. 
Measuring productivity growth and excess knowledge 
We measure productivity growth tyˆ and excess knowledge tA



1
for all 11 
countries in the sample. Productivity is defined as real output per hours-worked. For 
real output put we use EUKLEMS value added measure (VA), which we deflate by 
the value added price, VA_P (2010=100). We then measure real value added per 
hours worked by dividing the real value added by total hours by persons – engaged 
(H_EMP). The growth rate of this would be our measure of productivity growth.  
 
However, EUKLEMS provide two measures of value added and prices, a total 
economy and a market measure. We use the market economy measure, which 
excludes sectors whose outputs are “hard-to-measure.” These are lines L, O, P, Q, T, 
and U, which are mainly services: Real Estate activity; Public Administration and 
Defense; Compulsory Social Security; Education, Health and Social Work; Activities 
of Households as Employers; Undifferentiated Goods- and Services-producing 
Activities of Households for own use. Data are in figure (1). We shall come to this 
measurement issue again in the last section.  
 
Measuring excess knowledge  
For excess knowledge, we also use the market economy data to measure
tA
 , TFP as 
reported in EUKLEMS. The Penn World Table 9.0 reports time series for the share of 
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labor so it is 1  in equation (6). We take the average value over the samples. 
However, the parameter  is unidentifiable. Jones (2002) assumed that it is equal to
1  so that A is measured in units of Harrod-Neutral productivity. We use sensitivity 
analysis and calibrate the equation using a number of values. We that find 1
provides the best fit for every country in the sample. Recall that the production 
function (eq. 1) exhibits increasing returns to scale.  
The deep parameter is very difficult to measure.  To measure




 11
we need 
values for and , but estimation of equation (4) is hampered by the discontinuity of 
the time series data for
itAL , (the number of researchers). Jones (2002) provided more 
than one estimate for using different methods. He suggested that the value for the 
U.S. is between 0.05 and 0.30.  
Dividing both sides of equation (4) by tA gives:  












1
,
t
tA
t
t
A
H
A
A
         (8) 
The equation says that the growth rate of TFP depends on the ratio of the quantity of 
human capital used in the production of knowledge to the level of productivity. Both
tAH , and tA are upward trending and the growth rate of TFP is I(0).  Jones (2002) 
argues that the parameter de-trends the ratio ttA AH /,
 to give an I(0) TFP growth rate. 
Therefore, the parameter is equal to the ratio ttA AH

/, , where tAH ,

is the growth rate. 
The effective world research effort
tAH , was defined in equation (5) as

11
1
,
i
itAit Lh

, 
where h is human capital. The human capital index is reported in the Penn World 
Table 9.0, and it does vary significantly over time. The number of researchers itL is 
reported in the World Bank data, but the time series has missing years across the 
panel. For this reason, we calculate
tAH , for the year 1995 and the year 2014 then 
compute the weighted
tAH , and the growth rate over that range. The value of the 
weight  did not seem to matter for the computation of . We tried Zero, and the 
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share of the number of researchers in the total number of researcher in these 11 
countries. The results do not change.    
 
Note that n has to be small in magnitude since the growth rate of population in the 
EU and the U.S. is small, less than 1 percent on average. Thus, the size of does not 
matter a great deal for the computing excess knowledge. 
 
Table (1) reports the values of , , and , which we use in computing excess 
knowledge. Jones (2002) estimate for the U.S. was 0.30. We too have the exact 
estimate; however, for Finland we have 0.81 and -0.20 and -0.27 for Italy and Spain 
respectively because TFP growth over the sample was negative.    
 
Population growth is measured by the growth rate of the labor force. We take the 
average of all 11 countries’ labor force productivity growth, which is 0.81 percent 
(less than 1 percent). This the term n - the steady state – growth is rather a small 
number.  
 
Now we have all the data necessary to measure productivity growth and excess 
knowledge. Figures 2 plots the data for each country. The scattered plots around the
45 line indicate that excess knowledge explains real value added / hour-worked 
productivity rather very well in all countries, except in France and Spain. There is an 
obvious significant cross-country variation in the data. And, the effect of the global 
financial crisis and the Great Recession is evident, except for Germany. For the rest of 
the EU (2008-2009), Sweden (2008-2009, 2009-2010, and 2010-2011), and the U.S. 
(2007-2008) data are far from the
45 line.    
3.2 International productivity growth differentials 
 
The most important hypothesis is one regarding the international productivity growth 
differential. Do differences in excess knowledge explain differences in productivity 
growth? If so, then it would constitute a significant support for Kuznets (1960) and 
Jones (2002) models and it would answer Prescott’s (1998) observation that factor 
inputs, tangible and intangible cannot account for the international productivity 
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differentials. Conversely, Restuccia and Rogerson (2017) argue that misallocation of 
factors of production explains some of the productivity differences, albeit between the 
rich and the poor countries. As shown earlier, the model predicts that TFP growth is 
determined by effective world research efforts, which is ultimately tied by population 
growth in the advanced countries.  
 
We define international differentials as the deviations of the magnitudes of each 
country of the 10-EU countries from the U.S. We measure the deviations of the 
average of each country’s productivity growth and excess knowledge from the U.S. 
average magnitudes. Figure (3) is a scatter plot of these averages; only France and 
U.K. are off the
45 line. Excess knowledge differentials explain 80 percent of the 
differences in productivity growth on average. This result is remarkable new 
evidence. Our finding is somewhat consistent with the current literature that the 
frontier of technology and best practices diffuses at different rates across countries, 
including advanced countries. 
 
   Sector-led productivity growth  
To examine the fit of the model in equation (7) we only need to measure for each 
country.
vi
 We assume 10  . We take the ratio of log TFP of the sector measured as 
Tornqvist indices to the market economy log TFP (eq. 2 Appendix I). We allowed that 
parameter to vary across the sample, hence
ijt , for country i , sector j and year t  even 
though it would not significantly change the result if we use the average value over 
the sample. Table (2) reports the values of , which we used in estimating excess 
knowledge in the sector model. The rest of the parameters , and are the same as 
reported in table (1). 
 
Figures 4 plots the results country-by-sectors. We test three sectors: information and 
communication; manufacturing; and finance. The sectors excess knowledge varies 
significantly from one sector to another within each country, and across countries. 
The variations are larger than the ones we observed in the country’s aggregate excess 
knowledge.   
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Figure (4.1) plots the Austrian data. The scattered points are far from the
45 line, 
except for a manufacturing (black). There is no support to neither the information nor 
the finance – led growth hypotheses. Belgium is quite different. Figure (4.2) shows 
Belgium’s; with closer associations between the sector’s excess knowledge and 
aggregate productivity growth for manufacturing and the information sectors around 
the
45 line. Even the finance sector seems to be closer to the
45 line if we ignore the 
global financial crisis periods. 
 
Figure (4.3) plots the Finish data. There is much more association between excess 
knowledge in the sectors and productivity growth than in Austria and Belgium, crises 
and the Great Recession notwithstanding.  
 
Figure (4.4) plots the French data, which display even tighter association between the 
sectors excess knowledge and aggregate productivity growth than in previous 
countries. Information, manufacturing, and even finance excess knowledge seem to be 
associated with productivity growth. Also a lot more strayed scatter dots associated 
with various crisis such as Dotcom (2001), the Asian (1997) and the global financial 
crises, and the Great Recession (2008). There is more support for the sectoral excess 
knowledge – productivity growth than to aggregate excess knowledge in Figure (5).   
 
Figure (4.5) displays the German sectoral data. The global financial crisis had affected 
both the finance and the manufacturing sectors more than it affected the countries 
above. There are tight fluctuations around the
45 line nevertheless; not so for the 
information sector. There are a number of scatter points in the finance sector drifting 
away with extreme values from the
45 line in the years 2002-2004, which could be 
related to the Dotcom crisis in 2001-2002. Figure (4.6) plots the Italian sectors. The 
finance sector fluctuated widely, and away from productivity and the 
45 line since 
the late 1990s, which coincides with the Asian financial crisis; it has no association 
with productivity growth. Even though the support for finance – led growth has been 
dismal so far, the hypothesis fails significantly in Italy. Manufacturing seems to have 
the highest association with productivity. We find little or no association between the 
information sector and productivity in Italy. 
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Figure (4.7) is for the Netherlands. The data provide more support to the sector-led 
growth hypothesis. The global financial crisis notwithstanding, all sectors excess 
knowledge seems to be associated with productivity growth. The financial crisis 
(2008-2009) affected all three sectors equally. Figure (4.8) displays the Spanish data, 
which are very similar to the Italian data. There is no support to the hypotheses that 
finance or/and information technology has any effect on productivity growth. Most of 
the support comes from the manufacturing sector. The black dots tightly fluctuate 
around the 
45 line. 
 
Figure (4.9) plots the Swedish data. The Swedish experience is similar to that of the 
Dutch. All sectors, global financial crisis notwithstanding, seem to contribute to 
productivity growth.  Figure (4.10) for the U.K. shows more support for the 
manufacturing and finance sectors than to the information sector-led growth. Finally, 
figure (4.11) for the U.S. shows a huge variance, and a significant impact of the 
financial crisis, the dotcom crisis in 2001 and the Great Recession. Nevertheless, the 
scatter plots vary around the
45 line in support of the hypothesis of sector-led growth. 
It seems like all sectors have associations with productivity growth. 
 
Generally speaking, the sectoral data seem to lend reasonable empirical support to the 
sector-led growth hypothesis, but the effects of the financial crisis, whether the global 
financial crisis or the Asian financial crisis, seem to manifest more in sectoral data 
than in the aggregate data. The finance-led growth hypothesis has a relatively less 
support by the data. There is some evidence for the information sector, and more 
evidence for manufacturing. We only examined three sectors, thus it remains possible 
that other sectoral changes have effects on productivity growth.  
 
Figures (5) and (6) summarize the sectoral analysis. We plot the average excess 
knowledge by sector for each country in figure (25). The variation is much clearer in 
the finance and the information sectors, more so than in manufacturing. Germany has 
a negative average excess knowledge. France, the U.K. and the U.S. have the smallest 
excess average excess knowledge in the sample. We observe huge excess knowledge 
in the information sector, except in Austria, which is a small negative number. Figure 
(26) plots the average excess knowledge in the sectors against average productivity 
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growth. Average excess knowledge in manufacturing across countries seem to be 
more correlated with productivity growth along the
45 line. Average excess 
knowledge in finance, however, does not seem less correlated with productivity 
growth than the manufacturing sector, but they have larger variance. For the finance 
sector, the global financial crisis and the Asian crisis before it had significant effects 
in Germany, Austria, Spain and maybe France. These red dots are farther away from 
the
45 line. For the information sector, Finland, Germany, and the U.K. are way off 
the
45 line. Therefore, in summary we would argue that the manufacturing sector-led 
growth hypothesis has more support in the data than finance and information-led 
growth, but volatility in these two sectors’ excess knowledge and productivity was 
probably affecting the calculations.  
 
3.3 The missing productivity 
 
There has been a lot of concern about the decline in productivity in the developed 
countries lately. Feldstein (2017) argues that mismeasurement of the quality 
improvement in GDP explains the missing productivity level. Mismeeasurement is a 
plausible explanation. Relevant to this issue, generally speaking, is our use of market 
instead of total productivity data. Figure (1) showed real value added per hour growth 
rate (i.e., productivity growth rate) using the two measures, and the difference. The 
market economy measure yields a significantly higher productivity growth. This 
might be somewhat consistent with measurement explanation of the missing 
productivity puzzle. The market measure excludes services sectors, where output is 
hard to measure. Countries with relatively larger public services sectors such as the 
European countries miss significant productivity growth using the total economy 
measure; 1.5 percent in France, 0.78 percent in Finland, 1.06 percent in the 
Netherlands, and 0.81 percent in Sweden.   
 
Syverson (2017) focuses on ICT, but shows evidence that the slowdown in 
productivity has occurred in many countries and not only in the U.S. and perhaps long 
before 2004.  
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Bloom et al. (2017) argue, using the same Johns model (2002) which we use here as a 
basis for analysis, that evidence at the micro level U.S. data suggest that there has 
been an increase in global research efforts (i.e., the number of people in research) 
coupled with a sharp decline in research productivity. They say that is getting harder 
to find a new idea. This is a controversial assumption. Lucas and Moll (2014), 
however, assumed that the stock of ideas is never exhausted. Luttmer (2012) assumes 
that productivity is subject to a small Brownian noise. 
 
Fernald and Jones (2014) argued that the U.S. future economic growth is likely to 
slow down because educational attainment and population are likely to slowdown in 
the future. They also argue that the shape of the idea production function introduces 
uncertainty into the future growth. They also talk about the rise of China and India’s 
research growth, artificial intelligence, climate change, income inequality, and health 
care. 
 
Missing productivity seems consistent with the thesis of this paper. In our cross-
sectional data, we show significant association between excess knowledge and 
productivity growth along the transitional growth path in countries other than the U.S. 
Figure (7) plots the average excess knowledge across all 11 countries, which seems to 
be trending down slightly. Italy and Spain have negative average excess knowledge 
growth over the sample. Figure (8) plots the average effective world research efforts, 
and figure (9) plots the growth rates. The cross-sectional trend is slightly downward 
slopping. Therefore, some of the missing productivity along the transitional growth 
path in the developed countries could be explained, by: (1) mismeasurement of 
productivity, which includes sectors with hard-to-measure output such as health, 
education, defense, and other services. A market measure such as the one we used in 
this paper reveals higher growth rates as shown in figure (1), especially in countries 
with relatively larger public sectors and social services programs, such as Finland, 
France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.  (2) A decline in growth rate of excess 
knowledge in the advanced countries in general; and (3) a decline in the growth rate 
of effective world research efforts, which are due to decline in the supply of labor in 
the production of research that occurred after the Great Recession.      
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In the long run, declining population growth rate might put more downward pressure 
on productivity growth. There is a decline in working age population across the 11 
developed countries (Figure 10); a stagnation and a decline in fertility rate (Figure 
11); a decline in youth population (Figure 12). Aging population is a well-known 
issue in the advanced country.  
4 Conclusion  
Solow (1957) growth model is not a model for international productivity differentials; 
savings rates differentials are too small. Prescott (1998) showed that factor input 
growth differentials, savings, human capital and other intangible capital, could not 
explain international productivity growth differentials. To explain international 
productivity growth differentials we used Jones (2002) semi-endogenous growth 
model, which he tested for the U.S., to test the EUKLEMS (2017) data for 10 
European countries and the U.S. The model’s long run productivity growth is 
determined by population growth, which is consistent with Kuznets (1960). Along the 
transitional dynamic path, productivity growth is determined by the same neoclassical 
factor input growth rates, plus a new variable called excess ideas or excess 
knowledge. We showed that this variable explains 80 percent of the international 
productivity growth differentials.  
 
In this mode, excess knowledge is TFP growth weighted by the ratio of the share of 
technical progress in the production function and the share of labor, minus (or in 
excess of) long-run population growth in the advanced countries weighed by a 
parameter that measures effective research efforts in these countries (see equation 6). 
And, the growth rate of TFP is itself a function of the research efforts in the advanced 
countries (see equation 8). This is essentially saying that countries differ in the 
amount of excess knowledge they possess, thus have different productivity growth 
rates. Most importantly is that TFP growth is a function of global research efforts, 
which are based on the stock of knowledge, the number of people producing research, 
and human capital in the advanced countries in the world.  
 
We also modify the model to allow for excess knowledge at sectoral level. We tested 
hypotheses about sectoral-led growth for every country in the sample. We chose three 
sectors to test, manufacturing, finance and information. There is large literature on 
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each of these hypotheses. We found more evidence for manufacturing-led 
productivity growth, on average, than for either finance or information sectors.  
 
For finance-led growth hypothesis, unlike the existing literature we do not have 
money, credit and any of the typical variables used in testing this hypothesis. The 
association between excess knowledge in finance and aggregate productivity growth 
along the transitional dynamic path is highly affected by financial crisis such as the 
Asian crisis in 1997-1998 and the global financial crisis and the subsequent Great 
Recession between 2007 and 2009. We observe very large variations and extreme 
values. The same is true for the information sectors across countries in the sample. 
They too are affected by crisis such as the Dotcom. Nonetheless, excess knowledge in 
the finance and information sectors is closely correlated with productivity growth.  
 
Finally, the model sheds light on the decline in productivity growth in the developed 
countries, especially the U.S. The model predicts that productivity growth is tied to 
population growth in the long run, and to excess knowledge (along with the other 
factors of production) along the transitional dynamic path. All the countries have 
declining working age population (15-65), fertility rates, and young population (0-14). 
Further, older population (65 and above) has been increasing. The average effective 
world research effort growth rate has been declining slightly over the period 1995 to 
2016 across the developed countries (the EU 10 plus the U.S.) in the sample. These 
trends are consistent with the model’s predictions.  
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Table (1) 
The values of the parameters used in the calibration of the growth equation 
Country       
Austria 1 0.41 
0.402297 
Belgium 1 0.37 
0.283751 
Finland 1 0.41 
0.814458 
France 1 0.38 
0.122269 
Germany 1 0.37 
0.354242 
Italy 1 0.47 
-0.20123 
The Netherlands 1 0.39 
0.234447 
Spain 1 0.37 
-0.27976 
Sweden 1 0.46 
0.428839 
U.K. 1 0.38 
0.329777 
U.S. 1 0.38 
0.304491 
We conducted a sensitivity analysis for using values equal to 1 up to one and we found that a 
value of one gives the best fit. 
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Table (2) 
The average value of  used in calibrating excess knowledge in the sector model  
Country Information Technology Manufacturing Finance 
Austria 0.99 0.99 0.96 
Belgium 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Finland 0.98 0.98 0.99 
France 0.99 0.98 0.99 
Germany 0.87 0.98 0.98 
Italy 0.96 0.99 0.97 
The Netherlands 0.99 1.00 0.97 
Spain 0.98 0.98 0.95 
Sweden 0.97 0.97 1.00 
U.K. 0.97 0.98 0.99 
U.S. 0.97 0.98 0.99 
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Figure (1) 
 
 
 
The sample is 1996-2015, except for Belgium (2000-2015) and the U.S. 
1999-2015 because not all the data are available.  
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Figure (2)  
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Figure (3) 
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Figure (4) 
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4.5 Germany (1997-2015) 
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Figure (5) 
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Figure (6) 
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Figure (8) 
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Figure (11) 
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Figure (12) 
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Appendix I 
Modifying the model to includes sector growth. 
  1
tYttt
HKAY  ,        (1) 
where tK  is physical capital, tYH is the total quantity of human capital employed to 
produce output tY  and tA  is the accumulating stock of ideas created in the world. It is 
assumed that 10  , and 0 , which implies a constant return to scale in K  and 
YH and an increasing return to scale in K , YH and A as 111    
Sector assumption: 
Let us assume that the stock of ideas in any sector of the economy s is
ts
A : 
 ts AA t 0  ,                  (2) 
And the growth rate is g :   
AAs gg .          (3) 
Substituting (2) in the production function (1) gives: 




 

 10 tYttst HKAY          (4)
 
Now we describe each element of the production function. 
First, physical capital accumulates as usual: 
0,
0


KdKYsK
tttKt
        (5) 
Where a dot over the variable denotes the variation between two consecutive points of 
time;
tK
s is the fraction of output that is invested; and 0d is a constant depreciation 
rate for all countries.
vii
 
The aggregate human capital used in the production of output is: 
tt YtY
LhH 
,
          (6) 
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where
tY
L is the number of workers creating output and,  
htl
t eh
          (7) 
is the human capital per person, where lh is the time spent in accumulating capital 
(e.g., average years of schooling), and is the Mincerian rate of returns to education.  
The final element in the production function of output is the stock of ideas tA . 
Countries share ideas (there are no trade in goods and services in this model). Ideas 
created anywhere in the world are potentially available to be used in any other 
economy (Knowledge is non-rival and non-excludable). It follows that tA  
corresponds 
to the cumulative stock of ideas created anywhere in the world and is common to all 
economies. 
00 

AAHA tAt t
 .       (8) 
Let
ts
A , the ideas at the sectoral level be the same, where 
10;  
tt AAs
HH  ,       (9) 
and
tittt
AsA
M
i
iA HLhH

 1
1


;
tAs
H is the effective world research effort in the sector as 
a fixed proportion from the entire world research effort in the sector
tA
H , and
itA
L is 
the number of researchers in economy i . Note that here we have a subscript i . The 
index i  refers to the economies i  to M . Assume that global research is the weighted 
sum of research conducted in the advanced countries, and assume 0 , which means 
that the quality of research is constant across these advanced countries.  
Let 10;  iitiAs aLaL it  , then 
)(
1 i
As
M
i
itAs
a
L
hH it
t


  ,       (10)  
where 
itAs
L is the number of researchers in the sector only in a given economy i . 
From (2),

11
0 tst
AA

 , thus 
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

tst
AA

1
. 
Substituting in (8),  
 





 
0
1111
ttt
sAss AHA








 . 
So 






ttt
sAss AHA 


 0 . 
Or, simply 


tt sAsts
AHA 

,                   (11)  
The growth of ideas in the sector produced at any point in time depends on the 
number of researchers and existing stock of ideas. Allowing 10  captures the 
possibility of duplication in research, i.e., a doubling of the number of researchers 
produces less than a doubling of the number of ideas. Jones also assumes that 1 .   
There is also a binding resource constraint on labor. Each economy is populated by 
tN  
identical, infinitely-lived agents. The number of agents in each economy grows 
over time at a common and exogenous rate :0n   
Population grows at natural rate n  as follows:  
0, 00  NeNN
nt
t
         (12) 
Each individual is endowed with one unit of time, which is used to produce goods, 
ideas, and human capital. Because the time spent in school is excluded from labor 
force data, the labor constraints imply that each individual is endowed with one unit 
of time, divided among the production of goods, ideas, and human capital: 
thYAbYAt
NlLLLLL
ttFttt
)1(1   ,     (13) 
th
l is the time spent producing human capital. 
where
tt AAs
bLL   the number of researchers creating ideas in the sector globally as a 
proportion of 
tA
L , 0 < b < 1 . 
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Let
t
t
t
L
Y
y   the output per worker, 
tYtY
hHL
t
/  and
t
Y
y
L
L
l t
t
 , we get 

















ttt
t
t
Yttstyy
tY
Ytts
t
tY
tY
t
t
t
t HKAhll
hH
HKA
L
L
L
Y
L
Y
y 0
1
0
/
(14) 
Then from 




 

 10 tYttst HKAY  
we get 
 
)1()1(
)1(
0
)1/(
2








  

  tsttY KAYH t .    (15)
 
Substituting in ty and simplifying, we get: 






 

 1)1()1(0 )(
t
t
sttyt
Y
K
Ahly
t
 .      (16) 
Solving for sA we have  
  


















1
1
.0
ty
t
t
t
s
hl
Y
K
y
A
t
t
 .       (17) 
From (11),  0,
0


ssAsts
AAHA
tt


  we have: 






tsAs
st
st
As AH
A
A
g
t
.  .        (18) 
Or also;  





 
tst
AAss HgA )/(  .        (19) 
So 
)1()()1()(1 )/( 









  
tss
AAts
HgA .      (20) 
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Let
)1()( 





 then 







tss
AAts
HgA )/(1  .       (21) 
From accumulating capital equation 0, 0 

KdKYsK ttKt t  we get 
),()/.( ndKYsLKg ttKttk t 

      (22)
  
which gives 
,/
ndg
s
YK
k
K
tt
t


        (23) 
where kg is the constant growth rate of k=K/L. Given equations (16), (21), and (23), 
we get 





 

ts
s
t
t
A
A
tY
k
K
t H
g
hl
ndg
s
y





















1
0
)1( .    (24) 
The stock of capital K and sA  grow at constant rates, which require sAH growing also 
at a constant rate (asterisk over variables mean that they grow at constant rate) we 
have: 









ts
s
t
t
A
A
tY
k
K
t H
g
hl
ndg
s
y *
1*
0
)1(





















     (25) 
On a balanced growth path, all variables grow at constant rate and the allocations of 
hAAK lllS s ,,,, and Yl are exogenous, may differ across countries, and must be constant. 
The first term in parenthesis is capital-output ratio, which is proportional to the 
investment rate when the capital stock grows at a constant rate a la the Solow model. 
This economy exhibits a stable balanced growth path (possibly zero). Along that path, 
allocations must be constant. The growth rate of output per capita is proportional to 
the rate of growth of effective world research in the sector
stA
H . Since h must be 
constant along a balanced growth path, growth of the effective number of world 
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researchers in that sector is driven by population growth. The following equations 26 
to 29 show that.  
Equation (16) gives 
sAy
gg
)1( 


  .        (26) 
Also from 







ts AsAts
HgA )/(1   we arrive at the steady-state equation 
sAs
HA gg .
1





.        (27) 
Finally, since h (human capital per person) must be constant along the steady state 
path, growth in the effective number of world researchers in the sector 
t
AsH is driven 
by population growth, so: 
ng
AsH
 ,          (28) 
 then 
ngg
FAy






)1(
        (29) 
Differentiating






 

 1)1()1(0 )(
t
t
sttYt
Y
K
Ahly
t
 and add and subtract the steady-state 
term n , we get the growth rate equation:  
 ,)1(
)(
1
,
StateSteady
DynamicalTransition
tsYttttt nnAlhYKy 
















  
 (30) 
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Appendix II 
The data are from EUKLEMS (2017). The data set include all European countries and 
the United States. However, we only use the original EUKLEMS EU10 and the 
United States because the required data for the other countries are incomplete. 
We measure productivity ity  by real value added per hours worked. We deflate the 
value added VA (Gross value added at current basic prices- in millions of national 
currency) by the price VA_P (Gross value added, price indices, 2010 = 100) then 
divide by hours worked H_EMP (Total hours worked by persons engaged in 
thousands). EU Stat defines gross Value Added (VA) as output value at basic prices 
less intermediate consumption valued at purchasers' prices. VA is calculated before 
consumption of fixed capital. 
The aggregate TFP is Market Economy data. The Market Economy measure excludes 
lines L, O, P, Q, T, and U, which are the sectors real estate activity; Public 
administration and defense; compulsory social security; Education, Health and Social 
Work;  and Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and 
services-producing activities of households for own use.  
The data for the market value added output, prices, and hours are from 1995 to 2015. 
The level of market TFP and sectoral TFP’s varies. For Austria (1996-2015); Belgium 
(1999-2015); Finland (1996-2015); France (1995-2015); Germany (1996-2015); Italy 
(1996-2015); The Netherlands (2001-2015); Spain (1996-2015); Sweden (1996-
2015), U.K. (1998-2015); and the U.S. (1999-2015).  
The share of labor / capital and the human capital index are taken from the Penn 
World Table 9.0. 
Population is measured by the Labor Force as in Jones (2002), from OECD data. 
The number of researchers is from the World Bank. 
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i
 Jones (2002) does not cite Kuznets. 
 
ii
 See the mathematical representation provided by Richard E. Quandt in his discussion of Kuznets 
(1960) paper, page 340. 
iii
 Similarly, Gurley and Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969) and Hicks (1969) argued that a well-
developed financial system is important to stimulating economic growth. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) have contributed significantly to this literature with slightly different models. Bencivenga and 
Smith (1991), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), King and Levine (1993), and Mattesini (1996) are 
among a number of papers, which use endogenous growth models, though differ in many important 
aspects. For example, in Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), just like Keynes (1939), financial 
repression is not ruled out.  King and Levine (1993) have a Schumpeterian model of technical progress 
similar to Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), with a cost-reducing inventions applying 
to an intermediate product. Financial market affects technical progress by increasing the probability of 
having successful innovative projects, hence growth. The literature on the relationship between finance 
and growth is old and voluminous. Ang (2008), Trew (2005), Eschenbach (2004) and Levine (1997) 
are the most important surveys of the literature.   
iv
  In theory, financial development affects economic growth via two channels: (1) capital accumulation 
and (2) technical progress. The capital accumulation channel is essentially a savings-investments-
growth channel. A more efficient financial system mobilizes savings and channels them through the 
sectors of the economy in the form of productive investments, which is emphasized by, e.g., Wicksell 
(1935), Shaw (1955), and Tobin and Brainard (1963). Also efficient financial systems allow investors 
to diversify portfolios and hedge against risks (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983 and Bencivenga and 
Smith, 1991). Financial intermediaries manage and invest funds at a lower cost (e.g., Gurley and Shaw, 
1960). Diamond (1984) also shows that that monitoring costs is reduced through efficient financial 
arrangements. The other channel works when innovative financial technologies lessen information-
asymmetries, which adversely affect efficient allocations of savings and the monitoring of investment 
projects.  See for example Townsend (1979), Greenwood and Javanovic (1990), King and Levine 
(1993 b). 
 
v
 In Lucas and Moll (2014) knowledge is partially rival. In the short run it is rival because motivated 
individuals who want to increase their productivity must exert efforts to doing so, but knowledge in the 
long run is non-rival. 
  
vi
 This term could be estimated econometrically because the data are available to estimate equation (2 
or 3) in Appendix I. 
 
 
vii
 The fraction of output that is spent is 
KtS1  
